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Abstract
Natural deduction (ND) for ﬁrst order classical logic is obtainable from the intuitionist system by the
addition of Peirce rule. In a previous paper [4], it was presented a normalization strategy for the implicational
fragment with Pierce rule. The end normal form is divided in two parts: an intuitionist subdeduction
followed by a series of Peirce rule applications, maybe empty. Here, we extend this normalization process to
the system for ﬁrst order classical logic NP system. NP normal derivations also present the same structure.
This structure is the basis on which many properties for ND derivations can be presented. In particular,
we present a form of Glivenko’s theorem for the conjunction-implication fragment. Unfortunately, NP lacks
strong normalization, although ND with classical absurdity rule doesn’t lack it, as it’s well-known.
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1 Introduction
The natural deduction system constituted only by rules for →I and →E is not
complete with respect to the implicational fragment of classical propositional logic.
A natural way to complete the system is through the addition of a new natural
deduction rule corresponding to Peirce’s formula (((A → B) → A) → A):
[(A → B)]....
A
A
The addition of this new rule creates a new kind of detour that destroys the sub-
formula principle: a formula can be at the same time the conclusion of an application
of Peirce’s rule and the major premiss of an application of →E. This new detour is
similar to a traditional detour for systems containing classical ⊥-rule: a formula can
be at the same time the conclusion of an application of ⊥-rule and major premiss
of an elimination rule.
E. Zimmermann [11] has showed how to extend Prawitz’ normalization strategy
to Peirce’s rule such that applications of Peirce’s rule can be restricted to certain
atomic cases. In [4] it is showed that the implicational fragment added with Peirce’s
rule can be transformed into a derivation Π′ such that no application of Peirce’s rule
in Π′ occurs above applications of →I and →E. This strategy follows what is know
as Seldin’s strategy for normalizing classical proofs [10]. An interesting corollary of
this normalization procedure is the Glivenko’s theorem for Classical implicational
logic. This is presented in [4]. Unfortunately, the implicational fragment is not
strongly normalizable.
This paper extends results presented in [4] showing that the normalization pro-
cess obtained for the implicational fragment works for ﬁrst order classical logic.
It also shows that a form of Glivenko’s theorem can be obtained for the {∧,→}-
fragment with Peirce rule.
2 The natural deduction system NP
The system NP is a natural deduction system for the classical logic. The language
of NP contains variables for predicates, propositions and individuals; individual
parameters; signs for material implication, conjunction, disjunction, absurd (⊥),
existential, right parenthesis and left parenthesis. The grammar is deﬁned in the
usual way. The natural deduction system NP is deﬁned by the rules for {∨,∧,∃,→}-
introduction, {⊥,∨,∧,∃,→}-elimination, and a new rule of inference corresponding
to Peirce’s formula. This new rule is called P-rule as in [4]:
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[α → β]n....
α
α n P − rule
α α → β
β
→ E
[α]....
β
n
α → β n → I
α1 α2
α1 ∧ α2 ∧I
α1 ∧ α2
αi ∧E
α
α ∨ β ∨I
α ∨ β
[α]n....
γ
[β]n....
γ
γ n ∨ E
α(t)
∃xα(x) ∃I
∃xα(x)
[α(a)]n....
ψ
ψ n
∃E ⊥
α ⊥E
The ﬁrst three rules above we have constitute the implicational fragment, de-
noted by NP-Imp. The system NP-{∧,→} results from the addition of ∧I and ∧E
to NP-Imp. Negation is deﬁned as ¬α := α → ⊥. Natural deduction for ﬁrst order
classical logic usually also presents rules for universal quantiﬁcation. However it
can be deﬁned by means of existencial and absurd. The reduction operations to be
deﬁned below can not be applied to the universal introduction rule.
We shall use the notation r(Π) to denote the last rule applied in a derivation Π.
3 Normalization for NP-Imp
As said in the introduction, addition of P-rule creates a new form of detour that
destroys sub-formula principle: a formula can be at the same time conclusion of an
application of Peirce’s rule and major premiss of an elimination rule.
In [4] normalization was proved for NP-Imp. The main idea behind the strategy
is to push down applications of P-rule by means of reductions permuting applications
of P-rule with applications of the remaining rules.
The ﬁrst reduction, RED1, permutes an application of P-rule with an application
of →I.
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RED1
[β → γ]p [α]n
Π1
β
β
p
α → β n 
[β]r
α → β [(α → β) → γ]q
γ
β → γ r [α]n
Π1
β
α → β n
α → β q
The second reduction, RED2, permutes an application of P-rule with an appli-
cation of →E whose derivation of minor premiss contains no application of P-rule.
RED2
Π1
α
[(α → β) → γ]p
Π2
α → β
α → β p
β 
Π1
α
Π1
α [α → β]q
β [β → γ]p
γ
(α → β) → γ q
Π2
α → β
β
β
p
The third reduction, RED3, permutes an application of P-rule with an applica-
tion of →E whose derivation of major premiss contains no application of P-rule.
RED3
[α → γ]r
Π1
α
α r
Π2
α → β
β 
[α]q
Π2
α → β
β [β → γ]p
γ
α → γ q
Π1
α
Π2
α → β
β
β
p
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Deﬁnition 3.1 [P-proof] A derivation Π of α from Γ is said to be a P-proof if and
only if Π has the following form:
Γ
Π1
α
α.... n P-rules, n ≥ 0
α
α
where Π1 contains no application of P-rule. Π1 is called the intuitionistic part of
Π.
The fourth reduction, RED4, permutes an application of a P-rule with an appli-
cation of→E such that both premises of this application are conclusions of P-rule’s,
and the derivation of the minor premiss is a P-proof.
RED4
[α → γ1]p1 · · · [α → γn]pn
Π1
α
α
p1
.... P-rules
α
α
pn
[(α → β) → δ]pn+1
Π2
α → β
α → β
pn+1
β

[α → γ1]p1 · · · [α → γn]pn
Π1
α
α
p1
.... P-rules
α
α
pn
[α]r1 [α → β]q
β [β → γ1]q1
γ1
α → γ1 r1 · · ·
[α]rn [α → β]q
β [β → γn]qn
γn
α → γn rn
Π1
α [α → β]q
β [β → δ]pn+1
δ
(α → β) → δ
q
Π2
α → β
β
β
q1
.... P-rules
β
β
qn
β
pn+1
Besides the usual reductions for intuitionistic logic, the four reductions above
are suﬃcient to prove that the implicational fragment admits normalization and to
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prove a form of Glivenko’s theorem.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [P-Normal form] A P-proof Π is said to be in P-Normal form (PNF
for short) if and only if its intuitionistic part is in normal form.
Theorem 3.3 (NP-imp normalization) If Π is a derivation of α from Γ in NP-
Imp, then Π reduces to a PNF derivation Π′ of α from Γ.
Theorem 3.4 (Glivenko) Let {p1, . . . , pn} be the set of propositional variables
occurring in a propositional formula α. Then, 	NP−Imp α if and only if 	Imp (α →
p1) → ((α → p2) . . . ((α → pn) → α) . . .).
The proofs of this two results are presented [4].
4 NP-Imp strong normalization counter-example
It is well-known that Strong Normalization (SN) holds for classical as well intuition-
istic Natural Deduction. Prawitz [7] and Gandy [2] proved SN. Gandy provided a
more direct one. Of course, the implicational fragment has SN. This section shows
a counter-example to SN wheb Peirces rule is added to the implicational fragment.
Therefor, NP-Imp is not SN. In fact, if derivations are not prepared for the appli-
cation of RED4, the reduction procedure becomes inﬁnitely long.
Consider the following derivation Π of α → α.
[α]1
α → α [(α → α) → α]p
α [α → α]p1
α
α
p1
α → α 1
α → α p
[α]1
∗
α → α
(α → α) → (α → α) [((α → α) → (α → α)) → α]p∗1
α [α → α]p∗
α
α
p∗
α → α 1∗
(α → α) → (α → α)
(α → α) → (α → α)
p∗1
α → α
Notice that derivation of the minor premiss of r(Π) there is an →I rule appli-
cation between two Peirce’s rule applications. The correct strategy for normalizing
derivations apply RED4 after RED1. However, if we apply RED2 and RED3 in
an alternating way we produce derivation Π′ depicted below.
[α]1
α → α
[α → α]2∗
Γ1
Π1
(α → α) → (α → α)
α → α [(α → α) → α]p4
α
(α → α) → α 2
∗
α [α → α]p1
α
α
p1
α → α 1
[α]1
∗
α → α
(α → α) → (α → α)
Γ2
Π2
α → α [(α → α) → α]p3
α
((α → α) → (α → α)) → α 3
α [α → α]p∗
α
α
p∗
α → α 1∗
(α → α) → (α → α)
α → α
α → α p3
α → α p4
V.G. Costa et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 256 (2009) 5–1810
Where
Γ1
Π1
(α → α) → (α → α), for Γ1 = {(α → α), (α → α) → α} is as follow:
[α]1
∗
α → α
(α → α) → (α → α)
[α → α]2∗ [(α → α) → (α → α)]3∗
α → α [(α → α) → α]p3
α
((α → α) → (α → α)) → α 3
∗
α [α → α]p∗
α
α
p∗
α → α 1∗
(α → α) → (α → α)
And
Γ2
Π2
(α → α), for Γ2 = {(α → α) → (α → α), (α → α) → α} is:
[α]1
α → α
[α → α]2 [(α → α) → (α → α)]3
α → α [(α → α) → α]p4
α
(α → α) → α 2
α [α → α]p1
α
α
p1
α → α 1 [(α → α) → (α → α)]3
(α → α)
Observe that Π′ has more than four P-rule applications above r(Π′). If we
proceed by applying RED1 to permute down only one P-rule from each branch,
we can apply RED2 and RED3 again in order to produce a derivation with four
P-rules above the lowest →E. Evolving this way, the reduction process does not
terminate.
5 NP Reductions
This section presents the remaining reductions for the NP system.
The ﬁfth reduction, RED5, permutes an application P-rule with an application
of ∧E.
RED5
[α ∧ β → δ]p
Π
α ∧ β
α ∧ β
p
α 
[α ∧ β]q
α [α → δ]p
δ
α ∧ β → δ q
Π
α ∧ β
α
α
p
The sixth reduction, RED6, permutes applications of P-rule with an application
of ∧I. This reduction can be easily adapted when P-rule occurs only in the left (or
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right) branch of the ∧I.
RED6
[α → δ]p1
Π1
α
α
p1
[β → ]p2
Π2
β
β
p2
α ∧ β

[α]q1
[α]q1 [β]r1
α ∧ β [α ∧ β → ]p2

β → 
r1
Π2
β
α ∧ β [α ∧ β → δ]p2
δ
α → δ
q1
Π1
α
[α]q2 [β]r2
α ∧ β [α ∧ β → δ]p1
δ
α → δ
q2
Π1
α [β]r2
α ∧ β [α ∧ β → ]p1

β → 
r2
Π2
β
α ∧ β
α ∧ β
p2
α ∧ β
p1
RED7 permutes an application of P-rule with an application of ∨I (the other
case for left disjunction introduction is similar).
RED7
[α → δ]p
Π
α
α
p
α ∨ β 
[α]q
α ∨ β [α ∨ β → δ]p
δ
α → δ
q
Π
α
α ∨ β
α ∨ β
p
RED8 permutes an application of P-rule with an application of ∨E.
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RED8
Π1
α ∨ β
[α], [γ → λ]p
Π2
γ
γ
p
[β]
Π3
γ
γ 
Π1
α ∨ β
[α], [γ → λ]p
Π2
γ
[β]
Π3
γ
γ
γ
p
RED9 permutes an application of P-rule with an application of ∨E whose deriva-
tion of the minor premiss contains no application of P-rule.
RED9
[α ∨ β → δ]p
Π1
α ∨ β
α ∨ β
p
[α]q
Π2
γ
[β]q
Π3
γ
γ
q

[α ∨ β]s
[α]r
Π2
γ
[β]r
Π3
γ
γ r [γ → δ]p
δ
α ∨ β → δ s
Π1
α ∨ β
[α]q
Π2
γ
[β]q
Π3
γ
γ
q
γ
p
If there are occurrences of a P-rule over the major premiss and also over at
least one of the minor premisses of ∨E, ﬁrst use RED8 to permute all the P-rules
occurring over the minor premisses and then RED9 to permute all the P-rules
occurring over the major premiss.
RED10 permutes an application of P-rule with an application of ∃E.
RED10
∃xα(x)
[α(a)]q [γ → δ]p
Π1
γ
γ
p
γ
q

∃xα(x)
[α(a)]q
[γ]r [γ → ⊥]p
⊥
δ
γ → δ
r
Π1
γ
γ
q
γ
p
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Remark 5.1 A natural way to think in a reduction for the ∃E is:
∃xα(x)
[α(a)]q [γ → δ]p
Π1
γ
γ
p
γ
q

∃xα(s)
[α(a)]q [γ → δ]p
Π1
γ
γ
q
γ
p
However, it doesn’t work for the following derivation:
∃x((γ → β(x)) → γ)
[γ → β(a)]p [(γ → β(a)) → γ)]q
γ
γ
p
γ
q
But Sanz in [8] has presented an example where such reduction does not work.
RED11 permutes an application of P-rule with an application of ∃E whose
derivation of the minor premiss contains no application of P-rule.
RED11
[∃xα(x) → δ]p
Π1
∃xα(x)
∃xα(x)
p
[α(a)]q
Π2
γ
γ
q

[∃xα(x)]r
[α(a)]s
Π2
γ
γ s [γ → δ]p
δ
∃xα(x) → δ
r
Π1
∃xα(x)
[α(a)]q
Π2
γ
γ
q
γ
p
RED12 permutes an application of P-rule with an application of ∃I.
RED12
[α(a) → γ]p
Π1
α(a)
α(a)
p
∃xα(x) 
[α(a)]q
∃xα(x) [∃xα(x) → γ]p
γ
α(a) → γ
q
Π1
α(a)
∃xα(x)
∃xα(x)
p
RED13 takes a deduction whose conclusion of P-rule is ⊥ and gives a derivation
in which this P-rule does not occur anymore.
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RED13
[⊥ → γ]p
Π1
⊥
⊥
p
β 
[⊥]q
γ
⊥ → γ
q
Π1
⊥
β
6 NP Normalization
In this section we prove normalization for NP.
Deﬁnition 6.1 [Critical derivation] A derivation Π is called critical iﬀ it satisﬁes
the following conditions:
• r(Π) is not an application of a P-rule.
• The derivation(s) of the premiss(es) of r(Π) is (are) a P-proof(s).
Lemma 6.2 (Critical Lemma) Let Π be a critical derivation of α from Γ. Then
Π can be transformed into a P-proof Π′ of α from Γ.
Proof. By iterated application of reductions presented above and bounded by the
number of P-rules occurring in the critical derivation. Cautions must be taken when
we work with derivations presenting applications of→E, since we do not have strong
normalization (see section 4). If, in such derivations, both deductions of the minor
and the major premisses contains P-rules, ﬁrst reduce the deduction over major
premiss and then reduce the deduction over minor premiss. 
Theorem 6.3 (Normalization) If Π is a derivation of α from Γ in NP, then Π
reduces to a PNF derivation Π′ of α from Γ.
Proof. Using lemma 6.2, we transform Π into a P-proof Π1, a PNF derivation
Π′ of α from Γ can be obtained by the usual reduction technique applied to the
intuitionistic part of Π1. 
Lemma 6.4 Let Π be a PNF proof of α from Γ such that r(Π) is an application of
P-rule discharging α → (β → γ) or α → (β ∨ γ) or α → ∃xβ or α → (β ∧ γ). Then
Π can be transformed into a (new) PNF proof Π′ of α from Γ such that r(Π′) is an
application of P-rule that discharges, respectively, α → γ or α → β or α → β(a) or
α → β and α → γ. 5
5 This transformation aﬀects only the last application of P-rule in Π.
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Proof. Just apply the following reductions.
[α → (β → γ)]p
Π
α
α
p

[α]q [α → γ]p
γ
β → γ
α → (β → γ)
q
Π
α
α
p
[α → β ∨ γ]p
Π
α
α
p

[α]q [α → β]p
β
β ∨ γ
α → β ∨ γ
q
Π
α
α
p
[α → ∃xβ]p
Π
α
α
p

[α]q [α → β(a)]p
β(a)
∃xβ
α → ∃xβ
q
Π
α
α
p
[α → β ∧ γ]p
Π
α
α
p

[α]q [α → β]p1
β
[α]q [α → γ]p2
γ
β ∧ γ
α → β ∧ γ
q
Π
α
α
p1
α
p2

Theorem 6.5 Any Π proof of α from Γ can be transformed into a PNF proof of α
from Γ such that every assumption discharged by an application of P-rule has the
form α → β, with β atomic.
Proof. Directly from theorem 6.3 and lemma 6.4 
A PNF derivation Π in which every application of a P-rule discharging assump-
tions with atomic succedent is said to be an atomically expanded PNF (AEPNF for
short).
V.G. Costa et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 256 (2009) 5–1816
7 Glivenko’s Theorem for NP-{∧,→}
In this section we will show that for the {∧,→}-fragment a form of Glivenkos’s
theorem holds.
The reduction presented below collapses all the P-rules occurrences at the end
of the derivation into only one occurrence.
RED14
[α → δ1]p1 [α → δ2]p2
Π
α
α
p1
α
p2

[α]q [α → δ1 ∧ δ2]p1
δ1 ∧ δ2
δ1
α → δ1
q
[α]r [α → δ1 ∧ δ2]p1
δ1 ∧ δ2
δ2
α → δ2
r
Π
α
α
p1
Proposition 7.1 Let Π be a AEPNF proof of α in the fragment {∧,→}. Let α → β
be a formula, occurring in Π, discharged by a Peirce rule application. Then β is a
propositional variable occurring in α.
Proof. Since Π is an AEPNF, then β is a propositional variable. Consider α → β
occurring in a main branch of Π. Thus, it is major premise of an →E having β as
conclusion and minimal formula of this main branch. We remind the reader that
above the sequence of Peirce’s rule applications there is an intuitionistic normal
derivation of α from not yet discharged formulas α → δ, for some δ. Thus, by the
sub-formula principle applied to this intuitionistic derivation β is a subformula of
α, the last formula in this main branch.
Consider α → β occurring in a secondary branch. In this case it is the ﬁrst
formula of a branch concluding γ1, minor premise of an →E having γ1 → γ2 as
major premise. By the sub-formula principle, γ1 → γ2 cannot be in a branch
having α → δ, for some δ, as ﬁrst-formula. So, γ1 → γ2 is sub-formula of a formula
discharged by an →I rule, and hence it is sub-formula of α. γ1 is sub-formula of
γ1 → γ2. As δ is the minimal formula of the secondary branch, it is sub-formula of
γ1, which is the conclusion of this branch. Therefore, δ is sub-formula of α.
We have shown that in the case α → β is major premise of an →E the lemma
holds. It could also be a premise of either an ∧I or →I rule. In both cases, an
analysis based on the sub-formula principle for intuitionistic proofs would lead us
to the conclusion that α → β is a sub-formula of α. Considering that it cannot
be premise of a ∧E, it remains the case it is minor premise of an →E. Finally, the
case when α → β is minor premise of an → rule application is similar to the case of
the introduction rules. It lead to the conclusion that a formula having α as proper
sub-formula will be sub-formula of α itself. 
Thus we have the following form of Glivenko’s theorem.
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Proposition 7.2 Let α ∈ NP-{∧,→} be classically valid and δ be the conjunction
of the propositional variables occurring in α. Then (α → δ) → α is intuitionistically
valid.
Proof. The interesting case is when α is not an intuitionistic tautology. Let Π be
the AEPNF of α. From proposition 7.1, for each discharged formula of the form
α → β, in Π, β is a sub-formula of α. By iterated application of reduction RED14
we obtain a proof of α with only one Peirce rule application discharging α → δ,
where δ is the conjunction of propositional letters α.
In proposition 7.1, δ can be taken as the conjunction of all propositional letters
occurring in α. Consider δmax as being such conjunction. So, from α → δmax we
intuitionistically derive α → δ, where δ is as in the proposition 7.1. Hence, we have
an intuitionistic proof of (α → δmax) → α. 
8 Final Considerations
We extended normalization procedure for NP-Imp to the full system NP. Our work
shows how Seldin’s strategy of normalization for classical proofs can be further
enhanced. Since the proofs obtained can be splitted into an intuitionistic part and
a Peirce part, some properties can be extracted from this division. In some sense,
we were able to obtain a subformula principle for classical derivations form it as
well as a form of Glivenko’s theorem. We also remarked how subtle is the ordering
of applications the reductions. Further work on local/global conﬂuence of the set
of reductions are under investigation.
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